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Factors Associated with the Income
Distribution of Full-Time Physicians:
A Quantile Regression Approach
Ya-Chen Tina Shih and Thomas R. Konrad
Objective. Physician income is generally high, but quite variable; hence, physicians
have divergent perspectives regarding health policy initiatives and market reforms that
could affect their incomes. We investigated factors underlying the distribution of income
within the physician population.
Data Sources. Full-time physicians (N 5 10,777) from the restricted version of the
1996–1997 Community Tracking Study Physician Survey (CTS-PS), 1996 Area Re-
source File, and 1996 health maintenance organization penetration data.
Study Design. We conducted separate analyses for primary care physicians (PCPs)
and specialists. We employed least square and quantile regression models to examine
factors associated with physician incomes at the mean and at various points of the
income distribution, respectively. We accounted for the complex survey design for the
CTS-PS data using appropriate weighted procedures and explored endogeneity using
an instrumental variables method.
Principal Findings. We detected widespread and subtle effects of many variables on
physician incomes at different points (10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles) in the
distribution that were undetected when employing regression estimations focusing on
only the means or medians. Our findings show that the effects of managed care pene-
tration are demonstrable at the mean of specialist incomes, but are more pronounced at
higher levels. Conversely, a gender gap in earnings occurs at all levels of income of both
PCPs and specialists, but is more pronounced at lower income levels.
Conclusions. The quantile regression technique offers an analytical tool to evaluate
policy effects beyond the means. A longitudinal application of this approach may enable
health policy makers to identify winners and losers among segments of the physician
workforce and assess how market dynamics and health policy initiatives affect the
overall physician income distribution over various time intervals.
Key Words. Physician workforce, quantile regression, managed care, physician
income
Physicians in the United States are generally well compensated, with a median
annual income of $175,000 (Kane and Loeblich 2003), nearly seven times the
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$25,279 that a typical salaried worker earns (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). Yet,
with a $127,000 difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles of income,
physicians experience sizeable differences in aggregate earnings and sources
of income, with a corresponding variety of economic interests (Kane and
Loeblich 2003). Ongoing changes in health care financing, organization, and
delivery continue to erode the economic autonomy of the medical profession
(Starr 1982; Scott 1993) as purchasers, employers, (McKinlay and Stoeckle
1988; Navarro 1988), and consumers (Haug and Lavin 1983; Haug 1988)
exercise countervailing power (Light 1993). This fragmentation of the profes-
sion has led to diverse preferences for health care reform, depending on a
physician’s practice specialty, employment setting, location, and clientele. For
example, a survey of 300 primary care physicians (PCPs) in North Carolina
revealed that PCPs in family or general practice were less likely to support a
single-payer system than pediatricians (Millard et al. 1993). Health policy
analysts will thus benefit from a better understanding of the factors underlying
physician income distribution.
Previous studies of physicians’ incomes have mostly focused on the
impact of selected factors on the average physician income. Certain variables,
however, may not affect physician income ‘‘on average,’’ but may have dis-
tinct and significant effects at other points of the distribution, such as in the
upper or lower percentiles. In this paper, we introduce a conceptual frame-
work and a theoretical foundation to examine factors associated with physi-
cian income distribution, and provide hypothesized relationships between
income and each selected factor. We then describe our use of both the least
squares and quantile regression models (QRMs) in the empirical study to
examine the above relationships, using data from the 1996 to 1997 Commu-
nity Tracking Study Physician Survey (CTS-PS) and the mean, median, 10th,
25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of physician incomes to capture the range of
the distribution. We present our empirical findings and discuss their policy
implications, and we also discuss the unique contribution of the quantile re-
gression method to policy makers.
Findings from this study may provide a more comprehensive under-
standing of correlates of physician income, and also help to identify factors
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contributing to and consequences associated with income inequality among
physicians. Physicians’ incomes are often important, if indirect, targets of
health care policy reforms, while at the same time individual physicians and
professional organizations representing different segments of the medical
profession are often prominent and vigorous participants in policy debates.
The economic and political payoff and fallout associated with any health care
policy initiative requires solid information about how relative income gains
and losses within the physician sector are likely to be distributed. Hence,
information about how income is distributed within this occupational group is
critical in crafting proposals for even modest incremental reform.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Conceptual Framework
We developed a conceptual framework from the current literature related to
physicians’ incomes to guide our empirical analysis. Our conceptual model
grouped factors likely to be associated with physicians’ incomes into three
broad categories according to their level of analysis, which might be visualized
as three concentric circles. At the inner level is the individual physician with
associated demographic characteristics such as age and gender, and occupa-
tionally relevant attributes, which might be considered human capital factors
(e.g., specialty, formal qualifications as indexed by location of training and
board certification, and years of experience). The next circle includes factors
operative at the organizational level of the physician’s workplace, including the
overall organizational structure, management and governance factors, and the
clientele and market strategy. The outer ring represents the environment in
which the practice organization is embedded. These market-level factors are
operative at the local level through resources available to the organization,
competition from other providers, and the penetration of managed care or-
ganizations (MCOs). The market is also reflected in the regional and urban or
rural character of the community.
Model Elements and Hypothesized Relationship with Income
Individual factors such as age, gender, education, training, and hours worked
per week have been found to be associated with variations in physician in-
come (Pope and Schneider 1992; Moser 1995; Bernstein 1998; Simon, Dra-
nove, and White 1998). We anticipated finding higher incomes among male
physicians, physicians with more years of experiences, who worked more
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hours per week, and who were board certified or were graduates of U.S.
medical schools. In addition, we anticipated finding higher incomes among
surgical specialists (Gonzalez 1996; MGMA 1996; Kane and Loeblich 2003).
Organizational factors include ownership status, and type, number and
size of practices. We hypothesized a positive relationship between ownership
status and physician income (Moser 1995), and expected to find higher in-
comes among physicians in a large group practice (Gonzalez 1996) and those
practicing in multiple locations. As more physicians choose to work as em-
ployees of large organizations, the basis of their rewards change from that of
productivity (in a smaller, fee-for-service practice) to that of adherence to
specific rules or mandates to follow specific practice guidelines (in a managed
care environment). Even when physicians own their practices, health insur-
ance plans that pay for their services may use the results of patient satisfaction
surveys or practice profiles to inform physicians of their ‘‘performance’’ and to
assess their ‘‘cost-effectiveness.’’ More aggressive ‘‘primary care gatekeeping’’
mechanisms used by managed care may control patient access to specialists
and also aim to contain costs. Physicians’ reports of such medical care man-
agement techniques have been linked to fees for office visits (Gaynor 1989),
physician job satisfaction (Konrad et al. 1999; Williams et al. 1999), and job
stress (Williams et al. 2002); however, few studies have related these factors to
physician income or its distribution. Considering the association between job
stress and poor performance at work (Kahn and Byosiere 1992), which cor-
relates with income, we hypothesized a negative association between income
and the existence of stringent controls from upper management.
Factors representing clientele and market strategy include the sources of
revenue within the physician’s practice and the number of contracts with
MCOs. Newer physician payment arrangements, including capitation and
performance-based payment, might provide physicians with incentives for
cost-containment and quality improvement (Cooper 1994; Simon and Born
1996). Different fee schedules used by various payers provide incentives to
treat patients in certain plans, and to encourage PCPs to provide care to
patients instead of referring them to specialists. We hypothesized that phy-
sicians with a large proportion of revenue from capitated managed care plans
would have lower incomes because they would be less likely to recover the
higher expenses associated with caring for sicker patients under a capitation
system. A study by the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA)
found a dip in income with fewer managed care contracts among PCPs, and
higher incomes for PCPs with no or a higher number of managed care
contracts (MGMA 1996). The same report showed a decline in specialists’
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incomes as the number of managed care contracts increased. Thus, we hy-
pothesized that PCPs and specialists with no managed care contracts would
have higher incomes. In addition, among physicians who had any managed
care contracts, we expected to find greater incomes for PCPs with higher
numbers of contracts, and lower incomes for their specialist counterparts.
Finally, we expected that physicians with a higher percentage of revenue from
Medicaid or Medicare would have lower incomes, due to the low payments
and administrative complexity associated with such programs (Coombs,
Miller, and Leeper 1995; Phillips and Kruse 1995).
Market factors measure managed care penetration, availability of health
care workers (including physicians and nonphysician workers), and the ge-
ographic and economic characteristics of local markets. The rapid but uneven
growth of managed care across the United States has dramatically changed
physicians’ revenue sources (Simon and Emmons 1997). Simon, Dranove, and
White (1998) found a strong positive association between the state-level man-
aged care penetration and increased income for PCPs, but an insignificant
association between penetration and growth of nonhospital-based specialists’
incomes over time. Hence, we hypothesized that managed care penetration
would have a positive association with the incomes of PCPs and a negative
association with those of specialists.
Health workforce availability is measured by two ratios at the county
level: the number of physicians per 1,000 people, and the number of nurse
practitioners and physician assistants (nonphysician providers) per physician.
The distribution of nonphysician health care providers varies substantially
across geographic regions (Cooper, Laud, and Dietrich 1998; Shih 1999,
2000), but the association between physician income and geographic varia-
tions in the supply of physicians and nonphysician health professionals has not
been examined. A higher physician/population ratio is likely to have a nega-
tive impact on physician income because a surplus of physicians can create
competition in the local markets. The relationship between income and the
ratio of nonphysician providers per physician depends on whether the ser-
vices provided by the nonphysician providers are substitutes or complements
to physicians’ services; physician income will decrease with the ratio if the
services of the nonphysician providers are substitutive but will increase with
the ratio if the services are complementary. Because services provided by the
nonphysician providers are less likely to be substitutes for care provided by a
specialist, we anticipated that the association between physician income and
the nonphysician provider/physician ratio would be positive for specialists,
and negative for PCPs.
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Uneven physician distribution across geographic regions has been a key
health policy issue for decades (Madison 1980; Hynes and Givner 1983;
Frenzen 1991; Rosenblatt and Lishner 1991; Kindig, Schmelzer, and Hong
1992; Kindig and Yan 1993). Despite numerous federal and/or state policies to
attract and retain physicians (Eisenberg and Cantwell 1976; Rogstad, Harris,
and Fenderson 1981; de Castanos 1984), many rural areas continue to suffer
from physician shortages. Based on geographic variations in physician income
documented in the literature (MGMA 1996; Kane and Loeblich 2003), we
expected to find income variations across census regions, with the highest
incomes found among PCPs and specialists practicing in the South. In ad-
dition, we hypothesized higher incomes among physicians in metropolitan
areas because studies in the mid- to late-1990s cited economic issues as ob-
stacles to recruiting and retaining rural physicians (NRHA 1998).
METHODS
Data
Data used in this study included the restricted version of the CTS-PS, 1996–
1997; the 1996 Area Resource File (ARF); and 1996 health maintenance
organization (HMO) penetration data. The CTS-PS comprises surveys of
physicians in 60 randomly selected sites, plus a supplemental sample to enable
generalizability (Center for Studying Health System Change 1999) for all
nonfederal physicians providing direct patient care for at least 20 hours per
week. Specialists, such as radiologists, anesthesiologists, pathologists, and
medical toxicologists, whose primary responsibility did not involve direct
patient care were excluded. The CTS-PS contains physicians’ sociodemo-
graphic characteristics, specialty, ownership, practice size and type, physi-
cians’ perceptions of medical care management and patient interactions,
source and level of practice revenue, compensation, and income. A total of
12,528 physicians participated in the 1996–1997 CTS-PS. To ensure that in-
comes reported in the CTS-PS represented physicians’ annual earnings, we
included in our study physicians who worked full-time (35 hours or more per
week) and who had worked 40 weeks or more during the year in which the
income was reported. In addition, we selected the combined sample in our
analysis because it was the sample recommended in the CTS Users’ Guide for
physician-level analyses nationwide. The final study sample consisted of
10,777 full-time physicians.
The ARF is a public-use data file that contains county-specific data on
the population, economic factors, and health professions, and facilities. We
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extracted several market-level variables from the ARF, such as the total
population, population composition, and numbers of physicians and non-
physician workers at the county level. The 1996 HMO penetration data were
provided by Wholey et al. (Wholey et al. 1997; Wholey, Burns, and Lavizzo-
Mourey 1998; Center for Studying Health System Change 1999).1
Analytical Approach
We used a QRM to examine physician income at different points of the
distribution. The QRM extends beyond the notion of ordinary least squares,
which estimates the conditional mean of a dependent variable given a set of
explanatory variables (Koenker and Bassett 1978). The QRM can be used to
characterize the entire conditional distribution of the dependent variable
(Buchinsky 1998). The regression coefficient by associated with an explanatory
variable is interpreted as the marginal change in the yth conditional quantile of
the dependent variable corresponding to the marginal change in the variable.
Computationally, by’s at the median (i.e., y5 0.50) are estimated by mini-
mizing the absolute deviations, and by’s at other percentiles are obtained by
solving a linear programming problem of minimizing asymmetrically weight-
ed absolute residuals (Buchinsky 1998). Comparisons of by across different
percentile levels allowed us to infer the effects of a certain variable at different
points in the income distribution.
We examined the factors associated with the physician income distri-
bution using both least squares and quantile regressions. We conducted sep-
arate sets of analyses for PCPs and specialists because the literature has
suggested a large difference in income between these two groups (Moser 1995;
Gonzalez 1996; MGMA 1996; Kane and Loeblich 2003) and also that factors
such as managed care penetration have had a distinct impact on the income of
the two groups (Simon, Dranove, and White 1998). To the extent possible, we
used appropriate weighted procedures to account for the complex survey
design of the CTS-PS. In data with complex sample survey designs, estima-
tions accounting for only the sampling weights but not the clustering and/or
stratification in the sampling plan will still yield unbiased point estimates of the
parameters. However, the standard errors tend to be underestimated, thus
causing researchers to overstate the significance of certain parameters in hy-
pothesis testing (Korn and Graubard 1999). To our knowledge, current stat-
istical software dealing with survey data (e.g., SUDAAN and STATA) is not
yet capable of handling QRM in survey data with multistage sampling; there-
fore, we used a bootstrap method with resampling within a cluster (PSU) as a
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compromised estimating strategy to obtain the standard deviation of the
weighted estimates of the regression parameters. The purpose of applying a
bootstrap method to the weighted estimates was to preserve the unbiased
nature of the point estimates while correcting for some of the downward bias
in the estimated standard errors generated from a simple weighting algo-
rithm.2
Variable Definitions
Quantile regression requires a continuous dependent variable; in the restrict-
ed version of the CTS-PS data we requested, income data were collected at
$1,000 intervals and top-coded at $400,000.3 Table 1 provides the definition of
each explanatory variable; most variables are self-explanatory, only a few
need to be elaborated. A study by Kane and Loeblich (2003) suggested a
nonlinear relationship between physicians’ ages and incomes, suggesting that
income increase with age until mid-career and then decreases. Therefore, we
categorized physicians’ ages into three categories:  40, 41–55, and 455
years to capture the above nonlinear association in our multivariate analyses.
We classified ownership status of the practice as full, part, and none. We used a
list of mutually exclusive binary variables to represent physicians’ practice
types: solo or small group practice, large group practice, group- or staff-model
HMOs, academic setting, hospital-based practice, and all others. We dichot-
omized physician perceptions toward several management variables by cod-
ing the variable as 1 if the physician indicated that the factor had a large or very
large effect on the physician’s practice.
Endogenous Variables
In recognition of a potentially endogenous managed care penetration vari-
able, we explored endogeneity using the instrumental variables method. Fol-
lowing Simon, Dranove, and White (1998), we used variables representing
hospital concentration and employer size as the instrumental variables. Hos-
pital concentration was measured as the county-level Herfindahl index (HHI)
using information on the number of hospitals by bed size from the ARF
(Dranove, Simon, and White 1998). Simon, Dranove, and White (1998)
measured employer size by the percentage of employees in big firms ( 500
workers) and in small firms (o20 workers). We constructed similar measures
from the 1996 County Business Patterns file by calculating the ratios of small
and large firms per employee at the county level. We added median family
income as an instrumental variable because it was found to be a determinant of
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managed care penetration by Dranove, Simon, and White (1998), and was
shown not to be associated with PCPs’ or specialists’ incomes in our analyses.
Several organizational-level variables are also likely to be endogenous.
Endogeneity in variables such as ownership status or type of practice is likely
to arise from physicians’ self-selection, as these job attributes may be corre-
lated with the error term in the regression model through certain unobserved
physician characteristics. The percentage of revenue from Medicare or Me-
dicaid can potentially be endogenous. Because these two sources of payment
are financially less attractive than commercial third-party payers, it is possible
that a higher percentage of clientele from Medicare or Medicaid are more
likely to be found among physicians who are less successful financially and
thus cannot afford to be selective of their clientele. In addition, hours worked
per week could also be endogenous due to self-selection——a classic example is
that female physicians may choose not to work extensive hours for family
reasons.
For the Medicare and Medicaid variables, we used variables that differ
across localities (i.e., counties) such as the proportion of elderly population and
the median family income as instrumental variables. We also included HHI as
an instrument because areas with a high concentration of elderly are likely to
have more hospitals (and thus a lower HHI), whereas areas with a high con-
centration of low-income households are likely to have fewer hospitals (and
thus a higher HHI). The cross-sectional data used in our study severely limited
our ability to identify viable instruments for the other variables (ownership
status, practice type, and hours worked) that are potentially endogenous.
However, excluding these variables from the regression model might have
introduced omitted variable biases. We explored this issue empirically by
comparing two different model specifications: one with these variables ex-
cluded; the other with them included. We then compared the estimates be-
tween the two specifications and examined the statistical significance of the
variables in the second model specification (Stock and Watson 2002). If the
estimated coefficients varied noticeably between the two specifications or if
the added variables were statistically significant, we kept the potentially en-
dogenous variables to avoid omitted variable biases. We then explored the
possible direction of an endogeneity bias associated with ownership status and
practice type by comparing estimates across various quantiles in the QRMs.
The rationale behind this strategy was that the unobserved characteristics (e.g.,
entrepreneurship) correlated with both income and the choice of ownership
type were likely to place physicians at various points of the income distribu-
tion. This would then allow us to use the variations in the quantile regression
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estimates at different percentiles to infer the possible effect of ownership, had
the unobserved variable been observable. We addressed the possible endo-
geneity of weekly working hours by comparing two sets of regression models.
The first set used physician income as the dependent variable and included
hours as an independent variable (the income equation); the second set used
hourly wages as the dependent variable and excluded hours from the model
(the wage equation). We did not replace the income equation with the wage
equation, as was done in many labor economics studies, because the pay
structure for physicians is different from that of many other professions. Phy-
sicians’ incomes do not necessarily depend on the hours worked; therefore,
presenting only information from the wage equation for the purpose of avoid-
ing an endogeneity bias may overlook many other important factors associ-
ated with physicians’ income distribution.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Physician income distribution by percentile is illustrated in Figure 1 (see Ap-
pendix A) for PCPs and specialists, jointly and separately. The income of PCPs
was consistently lower than that of specialists across all percentile levels, and
the gap between PCPs and specialists widened at the higher percentile of the
distribution. The average annual income of physicians was $167,161
(SD 5 $83,764); median income was $150,000. At the 10th percentile, the
specialists’ incomes were $16,000 higher than those of PCPs ($96,000 versus
$80,000), whereas at the 95th percentile, the difference was $150,000
($360,000 versus $210,000). The top-coded amount of $400,000 appeared
to affect only a very small proportion of PCPs (those close to the 99th per-
centile of the income distribution) and specialists whose incomes were at the
92nd percentile or higher. Also included in Appendix A is a simple example
demonstrating how to interpret findings from quantile regressions, as this
method is relatively new to health services researchers. Summary statistics of
the independent variables can be found in Table 1.
Regression Analyses of Physician Income
The dependent variable in our analysis of physician income was log(income)
because of the skewed income variable. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results
of the least square and quantile regressions at selected percentile levels (i.e.,
10th, 25th, median, 75th, and 90th) for the PCPs and specialists, respectively.
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Table 2: Regression Analyses of Primary Care Physicians’ Incomes (in %)
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
Individual level F 5 107.3nn F 5 57.0nn F 5 63.0nn F 5 63.8nn F 5 106.6nn F 5 32.9nn
Demographic characteristics (%)
Age  40w 0.26 7.76 0.28  3.15  5.30  3.09
Age: 41–55w 7.99nn 13.75nn 7.76nn 5.42nn 3.22 6.10n
Male 22.45nn 25.88nn 19.84nn 21.90nn 19.00nn 18.78nn
Professional characteristics (human capital) (%)
IMG 1.56  0.05 0.92 0.43 0.04 1.94
BCERT 5.75nn 9.28nn 11.18nn 7.07nn 3.57 0.77
Extent of labor (%)
Hours 0.46nn 0.34nn 0.43nn 0.46nn 0.55nn 0.57nn
Organization level F 5 33.2nn F 5 21.2nn F 5 16.2nn F 5 7.5nn F 5 23.1nn F 5 21.5nn
Structural variables
Ownership status (%)
Partownerw 1.16 9.31 3.84 3.75  2.42  8.90n
Nonownerw  11.46nn  1.75  5.69  7.66  18.68nn  22.52nn
Practice type (%)
LRGSPECw 9.56nn 17.81nn 13.72nn 9.65nn 4.95 2.50
GRPHMOw 10.93nn 23.77nn 17.06nn 12.14nn 5.36  0.31
ACADGRPw 1.42 17.40nn 6.65  0.09  3.95  3.67
HOSPBASEw 13.15nn 19.15nn 18.22nn 13.24nn 12.16nn 5.93
OTHPRACw 5.81nn 16.59nn 9.83nn 7.04n 4.12  4.91
MULPRAC 1.12  3.05  3.69 1.11 5.06 1.19
Management and incentive variables (%)
AUT 4.33 7.77nn 5.12n 3.14 3.04  1.00
GUIDE  2.85  4.56  2.15  1.72  2.91  1.91
PROFILE  0.28 0.15  0.30  0.87 2.62 0.35
PTSATIS 1.88  2.09 0.19 1.48 1.46 4.14
GATE  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.05
PRODUCT 3.62n 4.78 3.19 1.97 3.63n 4.44
SALARIED  1.09 2.65  1.73  4.16  2.93  3.00
Clientele and market strategy
Source of payment (%)
NOCAPMCO 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06n 0.07n 0.04
PCAPMCO 0.05 0.13 0.11n 0.05 0.06 0.07
MCARE  0.001 0.08 0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02
MCAID  0.18nn  0.13n  0.14nn  0.13nn  0.19nn  0.28nn
Number of MCO contracts in practice (%)
# MCO  3w  4.56nn 0.22  1.59  2.78n  3.55  6.37n
# MCO: 4–9w  4.18nn  3.79  4.27n  2.12  4.20n  5.46n
# MCO: 0w  8.78n  7.86  6.21n  7.59n  5.02  5.43
Market level F 5 2.19 F 5 7.0nn F 5 9.8nn F 5 3.9nn F 5 10.5nn F 5 6.8nn
Local market characteristics (%)
MRATIOz 0.004n 0.01 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005
PENET  0.07 0.06  0.01  0.10  0.21n  0.32n
SUBPHYS  0.19  0.50  0.38  0.26  0.17  0.36
continued
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We converted the regression coefficients into relative effects (as percentage
changes) for ease of interpretation.4
Individual Level. Both gender and hours worked per week showed the
expected relationship with income across the board, with the largest
discrepancies observed between male and female specialists. Results from
quantile regression at the 10th percentile in Table 2 showed that the income
of male PCPs at the 10th percentile of their income distribution was 25.88
percent higher than female PCPs’ income at their 10th percentile, whereas
results from the quantile regression at the 90th percentile indicated that
male PCPs at the 90th percentile of their income distribution earned
approximately 18.78 percent more than females at the same percentile of the
income distribution of female PCPs. That is, the income discrepancy between
male and female PCPs was more apparent among lower-pay male and female
PCPs and decreased among high-pay PCPs. The hypothesized nonlinear
association between age and income was supported at most levels, except for
the 75th percentile of the PCPs’ income. Board certification status in general
had a positive effect on income, except for PCPs at the higher income levels
(75th and 90th percentiles). Compared with medical specialists, those with
specialties in surgery or obstetrics and gynecology (ObGyn) had higher
incomes throughout the entire distribution. With the exception of the 10th
and 25th percentiles, psychiatrists had lower incomes than medical
specialists, and the income discrepancy was more pronounced at the higher
tail of the distribution. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found no difference
between the incomes of PCPs trained within or outside of the United States.
Table 2. Continued
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
Census region/urbanization (%)
NORTHEw 4.09 4.78 3.53 4.72 4.66 5.81
MIDWESTw 3.40 4.61 6.03 4.93 3.03 2.15
SOUTHw 9.30n 11.45nn 10.05n 7.46 7.09 7.74
MSA 5.19 4.36 5.68 4.63 5.64 7.70
wReference groups (RG) for dummy variables are: Age, RG455; Practice Form, RG 5 solo or two
physician practice; Ownership, RG 5 full owner; Managed Care, RG 5 many ( 10) MCO con-
tracts; Geographic region, RG 5 West.
zPhysician-to-population ratios are transformed using the natural logarithm.
MSA metropolitan statistical area; MCO, managed care organization.
nIndicates statistically significant at po5 .05; and
nnindicates statistically significant at po5 .01 level.
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Table 3: Regression Analyses of Specialists’ Income (in %)
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
Individual level F 5 72.3nn F 5 43.6nn F 5 80.4nn F 5 100.5nn F 5 54.2nn F 5 127.3nn
Demographic characteristics (%)
Age  40w 5.17n 1.78 2.95 6.50n 4.87 1.25
Age: 41–55w 14.27nn 16.76nn 15.51nn 15.93nn 12.02nn 8.11nn
Male 28.86nn 44.95nn 33.28nn 26.11nn 15.99nn 18.27nn
Professional characteristics (human capital) (%)
Surgicalw 20.24nn 18.74nn 24.54nn 24.10nn 21.01nn 11.78nn
Psychiatryw  13.73nn  0.86  4.58  16.84nn  23.33nn  28.72nn
ObGynw 17.08nn 22.00nn 20.38nn 16.83nn 13.59nn 9.60n
IMG  0.76  9.16n  2.87 1.83 0.84 4.91n
BCERT 11.57nn 12.67nn 13.31nn 13.44nn 11.03nn 10.77nn
Extent of labor (%)
Hours 0.41nn 0.35nn 0.39nn 0.52nn 0.46nn 0.34nn
Organization level F 5 77.1nn F 5 12.0nn F 5 22.3nn F 5 27.2nn F 5 19.8nn F 5 38.1nn
Structural variables
Ownership status (%)
Partownerw 1.25 12.47n 6.74  1.54  4.69  4.36
Nonownerw  13.05nn  2.39  6.19  13.03nn  19.77nn  18.80nn
Practice type (%)
LRGSPECw 20.07nn 22.73nn 24.99nn 23.56nn 15.94nn 7.53nn
GRPHMOw 30.81nn 30.30nn 39.83nn 34.95nn 23.71nn 12.40
ACADGRPw 0.67 5.29 1.59  1.33  6.78  6.35
HOSPBASEw 17.22nn 27.62nn 20.95nn 19.61nn 9.97n 1.44
OTHPRACw 11.89nn 13.12 16.12nn 14.13nn 9.55n  4.02
MULPRAC  4.91n  5.18  4.86  4.35  3.59  4.52
Management and incentive variables (%)
AUT 4.47nn 6.16n 5.71nn 4.85n 3.34 0.59
GUIDE  6.60nn  10.50nn  8.60nn  5.74n  5.70  3.34
PROFILE  2.36  0.06  0.97  1.20  1.67 3.38
PTSATIS 1.84 5.61 2.19 2.68 1.14  0.38
PRODUCT 4.54n 6.95 5.12n 2.76 3.20 4.69n
SALARIED  4.58nn  6.71  4.57  4.93n  3.72  2.82
Clientele and market strategy
Source of payment (%)
NOCAPMCO  0.004  0.08  0.04  0.002 0.06 0.02
PCAPMCO  0.07n  0.01  0.08  0.12nn  0.09  0.12nn
MCARE 0.02  0.02  0.01 0.01 0.07  0.03
MCAID  0.15n  0.06  0.12  0.09  0.13n  0.17n
Number of MCO contracts in practice (%)
# MCO  3w  4.21  2.24  3.38  3.37  5.75  4.75
# MCO: 4–9w 1.36 5.12 0.23 0.46  0.31  2.61
# MCO: 0w  2.30  6.09  6.03  0.73  2.73  3.08
Market level F 5 21.1nn F 5 10.1nn F 5 14.3nn F 5 17.3nn F 5 10.4nn F 5 44.5nn
Local market characteristics (%)
MRATIOz 0.0004 0.005 0.003 0.001  0.004  0.005
PENET  0.19n 0.01  0.14  0.25n  0.21  0.23n
continued
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The only significant differences, we observed in the same comparison among
specialists were lower incomes for international medical school graduates
(IMGs) at the 10th percentile and higher incomes for IMGs at the 90th
percentile.
Organizational Level. After controlling for factors at the individual and market
levels, the majority of the organizational-level variables only showed the
hypothesized pattern at selected points of the income distribution. The
strongest effect of ownership status was observed at the upper tail of the
distribution, especially for income differences between physicians who were
full and nonowners. Compared with specialists in solo or two-physician
practices (a small practice), those in large group practices earned significantly
more at all levels, as we had hypothesized; however, a similar association
among PCPs was apparent only at the lower half of the income distribution.
Using PCPs in small practices as the reference group, PCPs practicing in
hospital-based facilities were found to have significantly higher incomes up to
the 75th percentile, whereas a higher income was found among PCPs
practicing in group- or staff-model HMOs at the low- to middle-percentile
levels. Similar comparisons among specialists showed a positive association
with hospital-based facilities and group- or staff-model HMOs for up to the
75th percentile for both cases. For specialists, providing care at more than one
practice was found to have a significantly negative association with incomes
only at the mean.
Table 3. Continued
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
SUBPHYS 0.06  0.10  0.12 0.12 0.32 0.29
Census region/urbanization (%)
NORTHEw 8.01 8.96 8.42 5.87 6.70 6.67
MIDWESTw 9.31n 12.73nn 8.57 6.29 8.97n 4.36
SOUTHw 10.78nn 18.01nn 13.39nn 6.66 8.61 3.72
MSA 16.85nn 14.03 21.13nn 25.48nn 14.92 9.55
wReference groups (RG) for dummy variables are: Age, RG455; Specialty, RG 5 medical spe-
cialists; Practice Form, RG 5 solo or two physician practice; Ownership, RG 5 full owner; Man-
aged Care, RG 5 many (  10) MCO contracts; Geographic region, RG 5 West.
zPhysician-to-population ratios are transformed using the natural logarithm.
MSA metropolitan statistical area; MCO, managed care organization.
nIndicates statistically significant at p  .05; and
nnindicates statistically significant at p  .01 level.
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Most management and incentive variables were found not to have a
significant association with the incomes of PCPs; the only exceptions were
a positive association with autonomy at the 10th and 25th percentiles, and a
positive association with productivity at the mean and the 75th percentile.
Among specialists, a positive association between income and autonomy was
found at the mean and the lower half of the distributions, and lower incomes
were reported by specialists who thought practice guidelines had a strong
effect on practice at the mean and the lower half of the distributions. The
hypothesized negative impact of Medicare coverage on income was not
accepted. The hypothesized negative association between an increasing
proportion of revenue from Medicaid and income was found among PCPs at
every point of evaluation and was supported at the mean, 75th and 90th
percentiles of the income distribution of specialists. In addition, we did not
find an association between the number of managed care contracts and the
income distribution of the specialists. However, the hypothesized ‘‘dip’’ in
PCPs’ incomes was supported at the mean, median, and 90th percentiles
among PCPs with three or fewer managed care contracts, and at the mean,
25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles among PCPs with a moderate number (four–
nine) of managed care contracts.
Market Level. After controlling for individual- and organizational-level
variables, we found that variables representing market-level characteristics
had minimal impact on PCPs’ incomes, as was evident from a much smaller
F-statistic in testing the joint significance of all variables at the market level.
Among PCPs, the hypothesized relationship between income and market-
level variables was only found between PCPs in the South and the West
(census regions) at the mean, and at the 10th and 25th percentiles. Market-
level variables had a slightly stronger association with the incomes of
specialists. A significantly negative association between specialists’ incomes
and managed care penetration was reported at the mean, median, and the
90th percentile. As hypothesized, significant income variations across census
regions were reported at the mean, 10th and 75th percentiles between
specialists in the Midwest and West, and at the mean, 10th, and 25th
percentiles between specialists in the South and West. Unlike the lack of
association between a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and the incomes of
PCPs, specialists practicing in MSAs were found to have significantly higher
incomes at the mean, median, and the 25th percentile of the income
distribution, with the largest income differences at the median.
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Endogeneity of Managed Care Penetration and Factors at Organizational
Level. Results from the two-stage least squares estimates showed that the
four instrumental variables we used (HHI, median family income, and
percentage of employees in big firms and small firms) were jointly significant
in explaining the variation in managed care penetration, and that they
satisfied the overidentifying restriction condition (Stock and Watson 2002).
However, we found no evidence of endogeneity of managed care penetration
for the sample of PCPs or specialists using the endogeneity test proposed by
Davidson and MacKinnon (Wooldridge 2000). We explored the endogeneity
of the percent revenue from Medicare and Medicaid variables using HHI,
median family income, and percentage of population aged 65 and above at
count levels as instrumental variables. Although the two-stage least squares
models indicated that these instruments satisfied the instrument relevance
and exogeneity conditions for both the PCP and specialist samples, Medicare
and Medicaid variables were not found to be endogenous according to
endogeneity tests. In addition, the two model specifications used to explore
omitted variable bias concluded against excluding these potentially
endogenous variables from our regression models.
Regression Analyses of Physician Wages
We then examined whether the observed differences in income distribution
could be explained by a difference in work effort (number of hours worked per
week). We compared hours across various characteristics (e.g., gender) and
found that even among full-time physicians, there were wide variations in
hours worked in several subgroups (see Appendix B).
Tables 4 and 5 present the regression results for PCPs and specialist,
respectively, using log(wage) as the dependent variable. Comparisons of re-
gression coefficients between Tables 2 and 4 allowed us to infer whether the
observed difference among various factors in the income distribution of PCPs
could be attributed to variations in work efforts (working hours). Similar
comparisons between Tables 3 and 5 provided information on the income
distribution of specialists. We found significant wage differences between
younger and older PCPs at almost all levels, but insignificant differences be-
tween the wages of middle-aged and older PCPs. Among specialists, the wage
regressions showed that the difference between younger and older specialists
remained insignificant, while that between middle-aged and older specialists
decreased; but wages of middle-aged specialists were still significantly higher
than those of older specialists. The magnitude of differences between male and
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Table 4: Regression Analyses of Primary Care Physicians’ Wages (in %)
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
Individual level F 5 18.2nn F 5 26.8nn F 5 33.0nn F 5 32.7nn F 5 28.8nn F 5 6.4nn
Demographic characteristics (%)
Age  40w  5.93nn  3.63  7.84nn  8.82nn  7.45nn  8.80nn
Age: 41–55w 1.96 5.71  1.72  0.39 1.70  0.44
Male 13.74nn 21.31nn 16.11nn 12.73nn 9.78nn 6.29n
Professional characteristics (human capital) (%)
IMG 2.46  2.98 0.59 4.04 4.63n 4.49
BCERT 3.52n 7.18n 11.06nn 5.37nn 1.96  3.91
Organization level F 5 35.7nn F 5 24.3nn F 5 22.5nn F 5 15.8nn F 5 20.3nn F 5 8.7nn
Structural variables
Ownership status (%)
Partownerw 5.31n 7.26 8.41n 8.40nn  0.48  11.07nn
Nonownerw  2.16 5.07 3.46 2.09  9.43nn  22.01nn
Practice type (%)
LRGSPECw 10.74nn 19.37nn 16.10nn 9.34nn 5.83n 7.33
GRPHMOw 13.20nn 19.29nn 18.14nn 11.85nn 6.47 11.02
ACADGRPw 0.50 9.49 7.94n  2.69  8.12n  1.23
HOSPBASEw 12.26nn 23.76nn 20.57nn 9.96nn 5.93 9.14
OTHPRACw 6.97nn 15.81n 13.95nn 5.21 1.52 0.40
MULPRAC  4.96  4.32  9.43nn  6.95nn  4.93  7.29
Management and incentive variables (%)
AUT 7.41nn 7.93n 6.56n 5.86nn 5.19 6.74n
GUIDE  2.67  4.47  3.73  4.72  1.95  0.83
PROFILE  2.29 1.18  0.90  0.77  2.84  0.92
PTSATIS 0.73  2.00  0.58  0.93 1.23 3.19
GATE 0.003  0.03 0.02  0.002  0.03 0.03
PRODUCT 0.55 2.32  1.47  0.89 2.35 1.71
SALARIED  0.50 5.76  1.43  2.79  1.10 2.83
Clientele and market strategy
Source of payment (%)
NOCAPMCO 0.07 0.12 0.08n 0.08n 0.10n 0.01
PCAPMco 0.10nn 0.24nn 0.14nn 0.08n 0.12nn 0.00
MCARE  0.08nn  0.01  0.07  0.09nn  0.10nn  0.09
MCAID  0.18nn  0.14n  0.09n  0.15nn  0.20nn  0.32nn
Number of MCO contracts in practice (%)
# MCO  3w  1.39 3.50 1.09 2.01  3.87n  3.91
# MCO: 4–9w  2.12 0.62  0.75  0.86  4.16  2.30
# MCO: 0w  5.96  0.75  2.87  5.86  5.56  5.68
Market level F 5 2.6nn F 5 6.9nn F 5 6.1nn F 5 9.0nn F 5 10.7nn F 5 2.2n
Local market characteristics (%)
MRATIOz 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.030 0.002 0.01
PENET  0.08 0.01  0.04  0.10  0.15  0.22
SUBPHYS 0.005 0.26 0.21  0.27 0.02  0.61
Census region/urbanization (%)
NORTHEw 3.20  0.91 1.00 3.86 6.54 4.04
MIDWESTw 2.58  0.18 1.30 3.07 4.12 1.95
continued
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female physicians, including both PCPs and specialists, was smaller in wages
than in incomes. Across various types of ownership status, the difference
between PCPs who were fullowners and those who were partowners inten-
sified when economic returns were measured in wages. Specifically, wages of
partowners were significantly higher at most lower percentiles (as compared
with no difference in incomes at these levels) but were much lower at the
highest percentile ( 11.1 percent in wages versus  8.9 percent in incomes).
Differences in wages between PCPs who were fullowners and nonowners
were lessened at the higher percentiles as compared with the differences in
incomes. A similar pattern was found among fullowner and nonowner spe-
cialists.
DISCUSSION
This study analyzes factors associated with physician income distribution us-
ing quantile regression analyses, and to our knowledge, is one of few such
studies (Kugler and Sauer 2005). This method allowed us to examine issues
beyond the ‘‘mean’’ or ‘‘typical’’ level of inquiry normally associated with
physician income studies. As we anticipated, quantile regression analysis per-
mits the identification of variables that affect physician income on a different
scale at various levels of the income distribution.
In some instances, variables exhibiting statistically insignificant differ-
ences at the mean were found to be significant at other levels. For example, the
income of academic PCPs was found to be compatible with, and higher than
that of nonacademic physicians at the mean, and the lower tail, respectively.
This finding suggested that academic PCPs may receive more favorable
Table 4. Continued
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
SOUTHw 6.49 6.57 5.54 5.95 6.26 5.55
MSA 7.09nn 10.54 9.39 7.94 5.35 9.88
wReference groups (RG) for dummy variables are: Age, RG455; Practice Form, RG 5 solo or two
physician practice; Ownership, RG 5 full owner; Managed Care, RG 5 many ( 10) MCO con-
tracts; Geographic region, RG 5 West.
zPhysician-to-population ratios are transformed using the natural logarithm
MSA metropolitan statistical area; MCO, managed care organization.
nIndicates statistically significant at p  .05; and
nnindicates statistically significant at p  .01 level.
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Table 5: Regression Analyses of Specialists’ Wages (in %)
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
Individual level F 5 25.1nn F 5 20.6nn F 5 54.1nn F 5 39.5nn F 5 21.4nn F 5 39.9nn
Demographic characteristics (%)
Age  40w  3.70  6.53  3.41  1.58  1.71  4.11
Age: 41–55w 6.84nn 7.79 9.18nn 7.95nn 7.18nn 4.72
Male 21.85nn 27.74nn 27.92nn 16.69nn 14.74nn 16.19nn
Professional characteristics (human capital) (%)
Surgicalw 19.29nn 19.41nn 21.57nn 21.39nn 19.31nn 15.03nn
Psychiatryw  8.03nn 6.37  0.06  9.35nn  16.53nn  20.82nn
ObGynw 14.10nn 17.30n 17.52nn 14.00nn 10.78n 9.21n
IMG  0.25  3.87  1.14 0.58 1.97 3.59
BCERT 9.47nn 14.58nn 11.25nn 12.31nn 8.71nn 10.61nn
Organization level F 5 44.3nn F 5 12.3nn F 5 23.8nn F 5 22.6nn F 5 10.8nn F 5 19.8nn
Structural variables
Ownership status (%)
Partownerw 4.17 11.24 6.57 1.84 0.21  3.82
Nonownerw  7.30n  0.40  4.30  8.56n  7.86n  17.50nn
Practice type (%)
LRGSPECw 20.10nn 31.10nn 22.06nn 24.49nn 13.28nn 11.29nn
GRPHMOw 34.53nn 50.63nn 44.16nn 41.46nn 19.31 21.61
ACADGRPw  6.24 6.08  6.58  5.45  16.76nn  11.43
HOSPBASEw 17.65nn 37.10nn 24.02nn 15.87nn 4.83 9.04
OTHPRACw 13.38nn 27.83nn 16.92nn 15.56nn 0.34 0.99
MULPRAC  7.88nn  7.15  8.66n  5.19  5.99n  9.76n
Management and incentive variables (%)
AUT 6.68nn 8.35 6.88nn 8.34nn 4.10n 2.77
GUIDE  6.46nn  9.31n  8.24nn  4.15  5.46  2.77
PROFILE  3.17 0.41 2.12  1.09  2.22  0.11
PTSATIS 0.57 1.98 2.83 0.67 1.36 0.38
PRODUCT 3.22 4.53 3.64 0.37 3.56 5.98
SALARIED  3.73n  7.60  3.31  3.77  3.50  5.76
Clientele and market strategy
Source of payment (%)
NOCAPMCO 0.01  0.002  0.03  0.02 0.09 0.02
PCAPMCO  0.07  0.03  0.10  0.14nn  0.07  0.03
MCARE  0.05  0.14n  0.10n  0.03 0.04  0.05
MCAID  0.20nn  0.19  0.15  0.18nn  0.11  0.15n
Number of MCO contracts in practice (%)
# MCO  3w  0.16  1.50 1.18  1.67  0.70  0.22
# MCO: 4–9w 2.84 6.43 1.83 1.54  0.01  0.18
# MCO: 0w 0.41 0.11  5.08 0.58  2.24 3.53
Market level F 5 21.8nn F 5 7.0nn F 5 6.7nn F 5 11.5nn F 5 6.4nn F 5 13.5nn
Local market characteristics (%)
MRATIOz 0.001 0.001 0.003  0.0002  0.002  0.003
PENET  0.17n  0.05  0.05  0.20n  0.16  0.14
SUBPHYS 0.05  0.02  0.08 0.25 0.25 0.24
continued
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income at entry level, but that their income may grow at a much slower rate
than the nonacademic physicians; consequently, their income advantages di-
minished at the higher income levels. Findings like this not only provide more
information to help researchers disentangle the intricacy of factors associated
with physicians’ income distribution, they represent the situations where pol-
icy recommendations based on the conventional method may fail to recognize
some effective policy parameters, thus, missing real opportunities to ‘‘make a
difference’’ in decision making. A good example from our data is whether
policy makers should target IMG specialists to recruit to ease the shortage of
specialists in under-served communities. Our results showed that the incomes
of IMG specialists were not statistically different from those of non-IMGs at
the mean; but at the 10th percentile, IMG specialists earned significantly less
than non-IMGs. This finding suggests that programs providing financial in-
centives for physicians to relocate to underserved areas are likely to be at-
tractive to a group of lower-income IMG specialists. Using only information
from the least squares model, policy makers would not know that a group of
IMG specialists may be responsive to such programs.
In other instances, variables found to be significant at the mean were not
found to be significant at some other levels. For example, autonomy was
significantly positively associated with incomes at the mean for specialists, but
not at the higher levels of the distribution; a finding suggested that specialists
who valued autonomy highly may exhibit certain personality traits that were
more important to one’s financial success at the early stage of one’s career but
less so at the late stage. In these cases, policy makers may design policies
around certain parameters based on the information from the mean estimated
Table 5. Continued
Variable Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
Census region/urbanization (%)
NORTHEw 6.89 1.66 7.82 5.81 5.01 6.81
MIDWESTw 8.39n 12.46n 10.62n 3.36 7.20 7.95
SOUTHw 7.93n 13.54nn 12.84nn 6.63 4.28 2.15
MSA 14.68nn 3.53 11.46 24.09 11.73 11.05
wReference groups (RG) for dummy variables are: Age, RG455; Specialty, RG 5 medical
specialists; Practice Form, RG 5 solo or two-physician practice; Ownership, RG 5 full owner;
Managed Care, RG 5 many (  10) MCO contracts; Geographic region RG 5 West.
zPhysician-to-population ratios are transformed using the natural logarithm.
MSA, metropolitan statistical area; MCO, managed care organization.
nIndicates statistically significant at p  .05; and
nnindicates statistically significant at p  .01 level.
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from the conventional method, anticipate seeing an impact but find the policy
to be ineffective. The variable of MSA in the analysis of specialists can be used
to illustrate our point. At the mean level, a significant difference was found
between urban and rural specialists. Some policy makers may decide that the
shortage of rural specialists is due to the lower income of specialists in those
regions and decide to provide financial subsidies or bonuses to increase spe-
cialists’ income in rural area as a way to retain specialists in rural communities.
However, our study suggested that at the 10th percentile level, there was no
difference in incomes between MSA and non-MSA specialists, but the in-
comes of these two groups were significantly different at the middle range (the
25th percentile and median) of the distribution. Therefore, unless the amount
of subsides or bonuses offered is large enough to be financially attractive to
rural physicians at the middle range of their income distribution, these policies
are unlikely to succeed.
Our findings have produced data that will assist health workforce policy
makers to project the impact of proposed policy initiatives, whether regulatory
or market-based, on the physician labor market. Information on the local
variations across health care markets that may affect physicians’ income dis-
tribution may, in turn, assist policy analysts to assess the political reaction of
physicians’ professional organizations in support of or opposition to policy
initiatives that are intended to encourage a more rational allocation of health
care resources. Most importantly, these analyses can help identify appropriate
parameters for workforce policies targeted at reducing income disparities be-
tween segments of the physician workforce while simultaneously improving
the geographic distribution of physicians and influencing the relative propor-
tion of specialists and generalists in the physician workforce. One concrete
example that builds on our findings is a better design of incentive-based re-
cruitment policies for physician relocation. Recall that our analyses reported a
higher income among specialists in MSAs at the middle range of the income
distribution and a lower income of IMGs at the 10th percentile of specialists’
incomes. This finding suggests that policies providing financial incentives to
IMGs at lower income levels are likely to be effective and relatively less costly
relocation strategies to alleviate the shortage of specialists in rural commu-
nities. In fact, that may be what successful state and federal loan repayment
programs have been doing by offering to pay off the education debts of rela-
tively young, lower-income physicians in return for a period of service in rural
or underserved practice settings (Pathman et al. 2000).
Findings from our study contribute baseline observations for longitudi-
nal analyses to examine how changes in health policies impact physician
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income distribution. These findings are pertinent for the community of health
workforce policy makers attempting to respond with meaningful policy in-
itiatives to the systematic changes produced by the trend of managed care. We
found that at all levels of income, the effects of managed care penetration are
demonstrable but are more pronounced at the higher levels of physician in-
come. This is consistent with a major objective of managed care plans in the
1990s——to reduce utilization of higher priced medical services, presumably by
targeting those with higher fees or procedure volumes. However, within mar-
kets driven by managed care, the individual physician’s participation in more
managed care plans is associated with higher income. This is consistent with
the notion that physicians can resist economic pressures where actual com-
petition occurs between health plans for purchase of medical services rather
than in near-monopsony arrangements, which erode their bargaining power.
Consequently, managed care is related to income level, but in a relatively
complex manner, and the modeling approach we have taken to examine these
relationships enables a more subtle and informed interpretation of how var-
ious segments of the physician workforce are affected.
A study based on the 2001 AMA Patient Care Physician Survey re-
ported unadjusted median income differences by various physician charac-
teristics employment type, specialty, census division, board certification status,
gender, age, and country of medical school graduation (Kane and Loeblich
2003). Our study, after adjusting for many possible confounding factors, found
similar associations with the majority of the above variables but on a much
smaller scale. A disturbing trend found in the AMA study was a widening
gender gap of earnings among physicians in the late 1990s, and continuing
into the current millennium. Our analyses showed that even after accounting
for differences in working hours, ownership status, and specialty, the female/
male income disparity persisted but was more pronounced at lower levels of
the income distribution. Male physicians on average worked more hours than
female physicians, thus, when we explored the gender difference in hourly
wages, the gender differentials in median wages of PCPs and specialists were
reduced but remained statistically significant. This finding indicated that part,
but not all, of the observed gender differences in physician income can be
attributed to male physicians working more hours per week. Future studies
should apply the quantile regression method to disentangle the factors con-
tributing to this apparently increasing income disparity by gender.
The nonlinear relationship between age and income observed in the
univariate analyses by Kane and Loeblich (2003) was supported at most levels
in our multivariate analyses. A similar pattern persisted when examining the
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relationship between age and wages among specialists, although the magni-
tude of differences between middle-aged and older specialists decreased, sug-
gesting that the lower working hours observed in older specialists attributed to
part, but not all, of the differences in income distribution across various age
categories. Among PCPs, a nonlinear relationship was not found between age
and wages. Although a significant lower wage was found in younger PCPs
when compared with older PCPs at most levels, there was no difference in
wages between middle-aged and older PCPs, indicating that the observed
nonlinear relationship between age and income was possibly due to older
PCPs practicing fewer hours.
Our study encountered several methodological challenges. The first
challenge involved incorporating complex survey designs in the estimation of
quantile regressions; we addressed this issue by obtaining weighted estimates
with standard errors generated from bootstrapping with resampling within
PSUs (see footnote 2). The second methodological issue concerned the top
coding of income variables. In the restricted CTS-PS data, physician income
was top coded at $400,000, which was close to the 99th and the 92nd per-
centile of the income distributions of PCPs and specialists, respectively.
Therefore, the truncation in income caused by top coding should be less
problematic for analyses of PCPs, especially at the lower percentiles. At the
75th percentile and higher of the income distribution of specialists, approxi-
mately 34 percent of the conditional quantiles were above the censoring point
($400,000) and the proportion increased to 86 percent for the 90th percentile
and higher of the distribution. Therefore, estimates of specialists’ incomes
at the higher percentiles were likely to be biased due to top coding. One
solution is to use a censored quantile regression (Buchinsky 1998); however,
methods to apply these algorithms to complex survey data have not yet been
developed.
A third methodological problem concerned potential endogeneity. The
endogeneity of hours worked per week could be addressed using instruments
such as marital status or number of kids in the family; however, none of these
variables were collected in the CTS-PS. Therefore, we isolated the effect of
hours by comparing the results between regression models using income ver-
sus wage as the dependent variable. Unobserved characteristics may motivate
physicians to self-select into certain practice types or ownership status, and
these characteristics are likely to place physicians at different points of the
income distribution. One advantage of quantile regression is that it allows us
to estimate income at various points of the distribution, which may reflect
the distribution of these unobserved characteristics (Arias, Hallock, and
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Sosa-Escudero 2001). Therefore, by examining the impact of these potentially
endogenous variables at various percentiles throughout the income distribu-
tion, we would be able to infer the direction of biases at the mean. If we
believed that ‘‘entrepreneurship’’ was the unobserved variable that correlated
with physicians’ decisions to become full- or partowners, then we could infer
the effect of ownership on physicians’ incomes by exploring the relationship
between ‘‘entrepreneurship’’ and income. The increasing difference in in-
comes from lower to higher percentiles between PCPs who were fullowners
and those who were nonowners may be due to the fact that business risk
tended to have stronger financial impact on the more entrepreneurial phy-
sicians, making a more dramatic effect on their losses and gains. If entrepre-
neurship could be measured, then the difference between fullowner and
nonowner PCPs would likely decrease once entrepreneurship was added to
the least square regression model. Although some of the biases caused by
endogeneity may be mitigated or conjectured through the use of quantile
regression, a more recognized approach is to utilize a panel data set to remove
the unobserved individual-specific effects by differencing between two peri-
ods (Kyriazidou 1997; Askildsen, Baltagi, and Holmas 2003). The more recent
rounds of the CTS-PS (Round Two for 1998–1999 and Round Three for 2000–
2001) contain a subset of physicians who were interviewed at each round of
the survey; future research can utilize the panel data formed by this subset to
address the endogeneity bias caused by self-selection.
This study provides a successful demonstration of the feasibility of an
analytical framework using the quantile regression method to study physician
income distribution. While one-time cross-sectional studies can be useful,
more and better information can be obtained with repeated cross-sectional or
true longitudinal designs. Such approaches can isolate winners and losers and
assess how market dynamics and health policy initiatives affect the overall
physician income distribution over various time intervals.
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NOTES
1. The authors initially planned to use county-level HMO market information such as
number of HMOs, total HMO enrollment, HMO penetration and competition
index from the County Surveyor data. However, further investigation of the
County Surveyor data indicated it did not provide reliable estimates for 1996. The
staff at InterStudy recommended the HMO penetration data constructed by
Dr. Wholey and his colleagues (Wholey et al. 1997; Wholey, Burns, and Lavizzo-
Mourey 1998).
2. Because an appropriate weighting algorithm for complex survey data is available
in several statistical software packages, such as STATA, we ran an experiment in
STATA with the least square regression model to test whether our bootstrap strat-
egy indeed produced standard errors closer to those generated from proper
weighting procedures. Four estimation strategies were compared in our experi-
ments: (a) svyreg, which accounts for sampling weights, PSUs and STRATAs in LS
regression; (b) a weighted LS (WLS) model with the ‘‘weight’’ option specified for
sampling weights; (c) a bootstrap method for the WLS model; and (d) a bootstrap
method with resampling within clusters (PSUs) for the WLS model. The standard
errors obtained from strategy (a) are considered the ‘‘gold standard’’ in our com-
parisons. Results showed that all four methods produced the same point estimates;
however, standard errors estimated from strategy (d) were closer to the ‘‘gold
standard,’’ followed by strategies (c) and (b) (comparison table available upon
request). Based on our experiment, we employed strategy (d) to estimate the
standard errors for the quantile regression parameters.
3. The possible effect of the top-coded income variable on the results of our analyses
was addressed in the Discussion.
4. For continuous variables, the conversion was done by simply multiplying the
coefficient by 100. For a binary variable, if the estimated regression coefficient was
b, then the relative effect would be 100  (exp(b) 1) (Halvorsen and Palmquist
1980).
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